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PROBABILITIES IN PROBABLE CAUSE 
AND BEYOND: STATISTICAL VERSUS 
CONCRETE HARMS 
SHERRY F. COLB* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Human beings often have difficulty applying abstract statistical information 
to concrete circumstances. In particular, we are more comfortable acting in a 
potentially harmful way when the anticipated harm is abstract and statistical 
rather than concrete and specific. For illustration, contrast the willingness of 
many repeatedly to risk causing death or serious injury by driving while talking 
on the telephone,1 with our apparent unwillingness knowingly to drive over a 
pedestrian’s foot to get to the hospital faster, even if the net potential gain is 
greater (and the cumulative harm lesser, over time) in the latter case than in the 
former. 
Like most standards of proof, “probable cause” necessarily contemplates 
that official action may be undertaken in situations under which there is some 
probability that the action will prove to have been “correct” (it will accomplish 
the objective for which it was initiated), and some probability that the action 
will prove to have been “incorrect” (it will cause harm that, ex post, was not 
justified). The inevitable consequence of such standards of proof is that, over 
time, some number of people (better estimated as the total grows) will suffer an 
undeserved harm. 
For example, if there must be a ninety-nine percent probability of guilt 
before it is permissible to convict a person of a crime, then when 10,000 people 
are convicted on this standard, we know that approximately one hundred of 
them are innocent. A ninety-nine percent standard of proof may nonetheless 
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 1. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS RESEARCH NOTE: 
DRIVER ELECTRONIC DEVICE USE IN 2008 1 (2009), available at http://www-
nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811184.PDF (showing that 812,000 vehicles are driven by someone using a 
hand-held cell phone at any given daylight moment). 
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sound like a very demanding one. It is almost certainly, in practice, more 
exacting than our current requirement of guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt.”2 
Yet, if we have one hundred people standing trial for a crime, and we know 
(after investigating in a timely and diligent fashion) that all but one of the 
people in the room is guilty and that one is innocent, we likely feel that we are 
carrying out a serious injustice by convicting and punishing all one hundred 
people. 
This article surfaces this “statistical versus concrete harms” disparity in 
judicial (and more broadly, human) reactions to probability-based behavior. In 
particular, it identifies the disparity in case law that either explicitly relies on 
the distinction as a normatively proper ground for legal decisions or that 
operates in a manner best explained by resort to this distinction. Though the 
paper is primarily descriptive, it suggests, tentatively, that lawmakers, judges, 
and juries should exercise greater care and deliberation in applying what may 
seem like a “natural” approach to distinguishing between permissible and 
impermissible harm. It is thus a plea for “conscious” consideration of the 
statistical–concrete distinction, which is sometimes applied in an unthinking 
fashion. 
In part II, I take up the case of arrest on the basis of “probable cause.” I 
explore the particular probabilities associated with probable cause and suggest 
that our intuitive reactions to an arrest scenario in which an individual (about 
whose guilt an officer is uncertain) is arrested on the basis of probable cause are 
different from what they are when a group of people (one of whom the officer 
knows is guilty and one of whom the officer knows is innocent, but between 
whom the officer cannot distinguish) is arrested. 
Part III explores the broader implications of distinguishing between 
statistical and concrete harm in legal decisionmaking. I consider examples 
involving the disparate areas of exclusionary-rule application, 
antidiscrimination or affirmative-action law, the death penalty, and negligent 
torts. By contrast to the probable-cause context, in which the Supreme Court 
has yet to reveal whether the law recognizes a statistical–concrete distinction, 
part III will show that the Court and other legal actors have been clearer in 
other contexts about both recognizing and attaching important legal 
consequences to the distinction, both explicitly and by implication. 
The fourth and final part provides an account of the difference in our 
intuitions. Psychological studies indicate that people distinguish between 
identifiable and unidentifiable victims when contemplating a potentially 
harmful act.3 The statistical–concrete divide takes things a step further by 
distinguishing between different kinds of unknown victims—those who are 
 
 2. See Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of Variability, 
36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 112 (2002) (citing empirical studies showing that the degree of certainty 
jurors require for proof beyond reasonable doubt varies greatly from 0.92 to 0.51). 
 3. See Karen E. Jenni & George Loewenstein, Explaining the “Identifiable Victim Effect,” 14 J. 
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 235, 236 (1997) (listing sources discussing the distinction). 
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determinate (that is, they stand before us and are therefore concrete, but we do 
not necessarily know precisely who they are)—and those who are statistical 
(that is, we know that they will exist but their precise identities as victims are 
both unknown and as yet undetermined). Doing the right thing or avoiding the 
wrong thing in concrete settings seems more accessible to us emotionally than 
in situations in which unknown and unknowable (though certain) casualties are 
involved, where we are able to perform a more flexible, cost-benefit-based 
calculus.4 
I conclude that the distinction seems at times sensible and unavoidable but 
at times arbitrary. I therefore neither endorse nor condemn the distinction but 
simply suggest that we must apply it with great care, precisely because it comes 
so naturally to us that we may overvalue it at times. If we use the distinction in a 
self-conscious fashion, the tension between statistical versus concrete harm 
provides for a dynamic system in which we can exercise sound judgment. 
II 
PROBABLE CAUSE AND THE STATISTICAL–CONCRETE DISPARITY 
A. How “Probable” is Probable Cause? 
The disparity between our intuitive reactions to statistical versus concrete 
circumstances emerges with clarity in the case of arresting a person on probable 
cause. The law does not require anything close to one hundred percent certainty 
as a prerequisite to a lawful arrest, so one need not imagine a courtroom filled 
with one hundred defendants, one of whom is innocent. The probabilities 
associated with probable cause are much more modest and thus lend themselves 
better to realistic intuition-testing scenarios. 
We do not know exactly what the phrase “probable cause” means, in strict 
numerical terms. We do, however, know what it does not mean: “probably.” 
That is, probable cause does not—in the context of Fourth Amendment law—
mean that the police must have evidence sufficient to conclude that a suspect is 
probably guilty or that she probably has evidence of a crime hidden inside her 
home. It is, accordingly, perfectly consistent with the constitutional ban on 
unreasonable searches and seizures—under existing doctrine—to arrest or 
 
 4. One might conceive of such a split as reflecting a consequentialist approach to large groups, 
coupled with a deontological approach to specific victims. This could also be described as the 
distinction between a legislative approach (in which costs and benefits are widespread and in the 
future) and an adjudicative approach (in which harms have already taken place and must be addressed 
in their fully-realized form). John Jeffries has argued that Section 1983 injunctive relief might work 
better than compensatory relief for certain constitutional violations because juries will not be as 
concerned about inflicting large costs on particular defendants. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the 
Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 50–51 (1998) (“Juries confronting a flesh-
and-blood defendant may be less quick to play Robin Hood.”). See also John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-
Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 110 (1997) (“Most importantly, injunctions 
promote reforms, not reparations. They direct societal resources toward investments in future growth 
and development, not toward cash outlays for past harms.”). 
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search a person on the basis of suspicion that does not rise to the level of a 
“preponderance” of the evidence. The arrestee’s guilt (or the presence of 
evidence in a place to be searched) need not be “more likely than not.” 
The Supreme Court has said that “‘[t]he substance of all the definitions’ of 
probable cause ‘is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.’ And this ‘means less 
than evidence which would justify condemnation’ or conviction . . . . [I]t has 
come to mean more than bare suspicion . . . .”5 The Court has also said, in 
discussing post-arrest, probable-cause hearings, that “[probable cause] does not 
require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or 
even a preponderance standard demands . . . .”6 Additionally, “only the 
probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of 
probable cause . . . .”7 And finally, the probable-cause standard “does not 
demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than 
false.”8 Though some of the cases are relatively old, the Court has not 
subsequently retreated from the position—however obliquely stated—that 
probable cause is something more than bare suspicion but something less than 
“more probable than not.”9 
Some may quarrel with the legitimacy of this standard and suggest that a 
preponderance of the evidence would be a more appropriate prerequisite to 
arrest.10 Even if one were to adopt a more stringent definition of “probable 
cause,” however, it would nonetheless remain the case that the standard does 
not rule out—and can be said, in fact, to contemplate—that innocent people 
will regularly suffer the indignity and deprivation of an arrest for crimes of 
which they are completely innocent. This consequence is unavoidable, 
 
 5. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 6. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 (1975) (emphasis added). 
 7. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969). Illinois v. Gates overruled Spinelli in favor of 
a more lenient standard, thereby leaving the absence of any need for a prima facie showing 
undisturbed. 462 U.S. 213 (1983), 238–39. 
 8. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (emphasis added). 
 9. Despite this language, it may be that in one class of cases, the probable-cause standard requires 
a preponderance of the evidence. This class consists of situations in which police uncertainty extends to 
whether or not a crime was even committed. If, in other words, police suspect but are not sure that a 
crime was committed at all, then it may be—under one reading of lower-court decisions—that police 
must acquire a basis for concluding that a crime probably did take place before arresting a suspect in 
connection with that crime. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 69–70 (3d ed. 1996) (claiming that lower courts apply a preponderance-like 
standard when there is uncertainty about whether a crime was even committed but a less-than-
preponderance standard when the crime is certain and the only uncertainty revolves around the 
identity of the criminal); see also Sherry F. Colb, “Whodunit” vs. “What Was Done”: When to Admit 
Character Evidence in Criminal Cases, 79 N.C. L. REV. 939, 948–54 (2001) (discussing the distinction 
between “whodunit” versus “what was done” crimes and how our evidentiary system does and should 
distinguish at trial between evidence of a crime in which the prosecution must prove who committed it 
versus evidence of a crime in which the prosecution must prove that there was a crime at all). 
 10. In personal communication, my colleague, Joel Atlas, raised the provocative question of how 
one can “reasonably believe” that something is true, as an officer must do prior to arresting a suspect, if 
one is not persuaded that, at the very least, the thing in question is more likely to be true than it is to be 
false. 
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regardless of the standard, if searches are permissible at all. Indeed, I have 
elsewhere argued that the Fourth Amendment, in setting out “probable cause” 
as a limiting principle for searches and seizures, explicitly and inherently 
balances the privacy and liberty of innocent people against the also-significant 
goal of protection of the public from criminal predation.11 
If it were otherwise, it would not be necessary to tolerate error—the law 
could simply bar all intrusive criminal investigation on the basis of anything less 
than proof beyond a reasonable doubt (or better, absolute certainty). Such a 
robust protection for privacy and liberty, however, would come at a great cost—
the inability of law enforcement to act to detect and, perhaps even more 
importantly, prevent criminal behavior about which they do not already have all 
of the facts. 
The Fourth Amendment compromise thus means, necessarily, that police 
who investigate to the extent that they may, consistent with constitutional 
limits, will sometimes inflict frightening, humiliating, and unpleasant law-
enforcement events—searches and seizures—on innocent people. If we assume 
that “probable cause” is as close to a preponderance of the evidence as possible, 
without actually rising to a preponderance, then the doctrinal standard 
contemplates that at least fifty percent of those lawfully searched and seized will 
be innocent and thus undeserving of any intrusion. 
The cost of requiring less than one hundred percent certainty is, then, the 
invasion of innocents’ privacy and liberty. To some extent, we all understand 
this and we still say that probable cause is an acceptable standard. Yet 
something happens when we know that a police officer is harming a specific and 
identifiable innocent person in a particular case. Suddenly, the cost of invading 
innocent privacy feels more immediate and offensive. 
Consider a simple hypothetical example: the police arrest two people, 
knowing that one but only one of them is certainly guilty of a crime. Though the 
probability of guilt with respect to each of the people is 0.5—enough for 
“probable cause”—it nonetheless feels, to many, potentially wrong to arrest the 
two people and thereby knowingly to arrest an innocent.12 
 
 11. See Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1472, 1505 (1996). 
 12. If the standard were greater than fifty percent, of course, one could still envision, with similar 
discomfort, a police officer who knows that two of three people are guilty and that one is innocent and 
arrests all three. One does not, in other words, escape the problem simply by raising the standard for 
probable cause. 
  I thank Steve Shiffrin for proposing that the doctrine of double effect (DDE) may explain our 
intuitions here. The DDE observes a moral distinction between intentionally and directly causing a 
harmful result (for example, by deliberately killing a person to transplant life-saving organs to five 
people), and indirectly but knowingly causing a harmful result as an incidental or collateral effect of 
engaging in otherwise justifiable and properly directed conduct (for example, by swerving a trolley 
away from hitting a group of five people, knowing that it will consequently hit one person). In the first 
case, we deliberately and impermissibly use another person as a means of saving five; in the latter, our 
intentional act is to avoid killing five people, and the death of the one is deemed an unfortunate but 
undesired (and conceptually severable) effect of that act. Using a person as an organ donor necessarily 
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In Maryland v. Pringle,13 the U.S. Supreme Court confronted a case that 
appeared to present the “knowingly arresting an innocent” problem. A police 
officer stopped a car in which he found a driver and two passengers.14 During a 
consent search, the officer found drugs.15 The officer told the group that he 
would arrest all of them if one did not confess to possession of the drugs.16 All 
three remained silent, so the police officer arrested the whole group.17 
Ultimately, one of the three confessed and exonerated the others, who were 
both released from custody at that time.18 When facing trial, the one who 
confessed claimed that he was illegally arrested without probable cause, 
because the police officer was arresting three men for the crime of one man.19 
In telling the men that he would arrest all three if the guilty party did not 
own up to possession of the drugs, the police officer manifested his belief that 
only one of the three men was responsible for possession. When no one stepped 
 
involves intentionally harming the one person, while swerving out of the way of five people does not. 
See Sophia Reibetanz, A Problem for the Doctrine of Double Effect, 98 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 
217, 217–18 (1998). 
  When we arrest one person on the basis of probable cause, Shiffrin suggests, we do not 
intentionally use an innocent person as a means of ensuring that we arrest a guilty person, because we 
do not know that we have an innocent person in custody. If the person is innocent (as he will often be), 
that is an incidental effect of our arresting without certainty (collateral damage of an otherwise 
legitimate act). On the other hand, when we arrest two people, knowing that one is innocent, we are 
intentionally arresting an innocent in order to make sure that we bring in the guilty person. The known 
innocent person in the latter example is thus analogous to the organ donor, while the occasional (or 
even frequent) innocent person in the former example is more like the individual hit by the trolley 
swerving out of the way of the five. 
  Though fascinating, the DDE is both under- and over-inclusive regarding the abstract-concrete 
distinction; the statistical–concrete disparity in intuitions occurs even when the DDE would not treat 
the circumstances differently. First, imagine a house on fire containing six people. Five of the people 
will die if the fire is not put out immediately. The sixth is in a separate part of the house with a 
respirator and could survive the fire but because of his location will drown if firefighters spray enough 
water to extinguish the fire. The DDE would treat this as a “double effect” situation (because the 
firefighters spray the water at the fire to put it out, thereby saving lives, and only collaterally cause the 
drowning of the one person). Yet the harm to the sixth person is concrete rather than statistical and 
thus intuitively more disturbing to people than, for example, equipping cars with air bags that will 
predictably cause some number of passenger deaths, because it will save more lives. 
  Second, consider a military draft system in which a lottery determines which individuals are to 
go to war to protect the rest of the population. The abstract–concrete distinction does not attach special 
condemnation to such a system, because the people to be harmed are yet to be determined and 
accordingly lack concreteness. The DDE, however, would treat such a system as unjust in the same way 
as the doctor’s decision to kill a particular patient to supply organs to another five patients is unjust—
both intentionally and directly inflict harm on one individual as a means of helping or protecting others. 
The harm is not collateral to the purpose but is an inherent part of it. Hence, the statistical–concrete 
distinction captures moral intuitions that slip through the cracks of the DDE. 
 13. 540 U.S. 366 (2003). 
 14. Id. at 367. 
 15. Id. at 368. 
 16. Id. at 368–69. 
 17. Id. at 369. 
 18. Id. 
 19. 540 U.S. 366, 372 (2003) (“Pringle’s attempt to characterize this case as a guilt-by-association 
case is unavailing.”). 
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forward, however, the officer arrested—by his own implicit estimation—two 
innocent men and one guilty man, not knowing which two were innocent and 
which one was guilty. In addition to knowingly arresting two innocent people, 
the officer also apparently arrested each of the men on the basis of a one-in-
three chance of guilt. Does this amount to probable cause? 
Had the Court accepted the proposition that the case truly presented a one-
to-three guilty and two-to-three innocent situation, it could have helped clarify 
the numerical standard for probable cause; it also would have revealed whether 
there is a constitutional distinction between, on the one hand, taking a statistical 
risk of 0.67 that one is arresting an innocent person, and, on the other, 
knowingly arresting two innocent people in the company of one guilty person. 
As it turned out, however, the Supreme Court said that there was probable 
cause and noted that the facts were consistent with all three men being in 
possession of the drugs.20 When three people occupy a car together and illicit 
drugs are located in that car, there is good reason to think, at least preliminarily, 
that everyone in the car is in possession. 
Because of its analysis of the case, the Court failed to answer either of the 
more-interesting questions. It left open what numerical odds are sufficient to 
amount to probable cause as well as what Fourth Amendment significance, if 
any, might attach to the concrete nature of the harm in a case in which the 
officer knows that one or more of the people he is arresting is (or are) innocent. 
If we imagine a slightly different case, we can hypothesize several possible 
results for the Court. Consider the case of a police officer who stops a car with 
three occupants (X, Y, and Z) and finds, in the course of a consensual search, a 
murder–suicide note, on which is typed “Today is [today’s date]. X, Y, and Z 
will die through a car explosion today. I am one of the three, and I have 
programmed the vehicle to explode thirty minutes after battery ignition. We are 
close friends, and because I will die and want company in the next life, I am 
taking the others with me.” The officer swiftly removes the three men from the 
car and, one minute later, watches it explode. All three of the men deny 
involvement. 
The officer now has good reason to suspect that one of the three men is 
guilty of attempted murder. She also has good reason to suspect that two of the 
three men had nothing to do with the attempted murder. If the note could be 
definitively tied to one of the three men, then it would plainly be appropriate to 
arrest that one alone. However, no such distinction is possible without further 
 
 20. See id. at 372–73 (“We think it an entirely reasonable inference from these facts that any or all 
three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine. Thus a 
reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe Pringle committed the crime 
of possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly. . . . ‘[A] car passenger . . . will often be engaged in a 
common enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence 
of their wrongdoing.’ Here we think it was reasonable for the officer to infer a common enterprise 
among the three men.”). 
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investigation. The question is whether the officer has probable cause to support 
the arrest of all three men. 
Another, less-outlandish, true example appears in a criminal procedure 
casebook.21 In this example, a police officer sees a car driving erratically and 
signals the driver to pull over. By the time the officer reaches the car, however, 
three men are sitting in the back seat, and no one is in the driver’s seat. The 
officer is confident that no one left the car after it was stopped. Therefore, the 
officer knows that one but only one of the three men was driving while 
intoxicated. If none of the three admits to being the driver, do police have 
probable cause to arrest all three? (We can add the stipulation that the car is 
registered to a fourth person, who is not in the car). 
One of the questions entailed is, of course, whether a one-in-three 
probability is sufficient to make up probable cause. We do not have a definitive 
answer to this question (and that continues to be the case after Maryland v. 
Pringle). We could, however, simplify the problem if we hypothesized two 
instead of three men in the vehicle. Statistical odds of one in two would 
ordinarily be an adequate (and perhaps more than adequate) basis for an arrest. 
Often, an officer has some level of defensible suspicion that all people to be 
arrested were involved in committing a crime. Sometimes, however, a greater 
level of suspicion attaches exclusively to one member of the group of people to 
be arrested, with the uncertainty going primarily to which person committed the 
offense rather than to whether any arrestee or arrestees committed the crime at 
all.22 
The officer who arrests three or even two people, knowing that—or 
believing strongly that—only one of the people is guilty of any wrongdoing, 
makes concrete the reality that two completely innocent people (or one 
innocent person)—victims, in the car-bomb scenario and simple (nondriving) 
drunks in the true example—are subjected to a loss of liberty and the associated 
humiliation and trauma. We intuitively experience this as somehow different 
from the situation in which an officer finds some evidence on a single individual 
that would, statistically, make the odds of that individual having committed a 
crime one in three or one in two (for example, possession of somewhat 
incriminating items that, in the run of cases, indicates guilt in every third or 
every second case). On the numbers, in other words, probable cause may be 
logically present, yet one might feel reluctant to say that it is therefore 
acceptable for a police officer knowingly to arrest innocent people. 
 
 21. JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, 
POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 158 (3d ed. 2006). 
 22. See JEROLD H. ISRAEL & WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS 70 (7th ed. 2006) (distinguishing the two cases and the probable-cause determination 
with respect to each); see also L. Jonathan Cohen, Subjective Probability and the Paradox of the 
Gatecrasher, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 627 (1981) (example of analysis focusing on the issue of which person 
committed the offense). 
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Yet if one assumes that a police officer performs many arrests in the course 
of a career in law enforcement, one could argue that distinguishing between 
concrete and statistical harms to innocent people is irrational. The “statistical” 
officer (S) arrests whenever the apparent odds of a suspect’s guilt are one in 
two (for example, the suspect behaves in a manner that, one in two times, 
identifies a guilty person). The “concrete” officer (C) arrests two people 
whenever it is clear that one of the two has committed a crime, but it is 
impossible to tell which of the two is guilty, without first arresting them. Over 
time, the law of large numbers dictates that if S and C arrest the same number 
of people (n), then each one will arrest n/2 innocent people. That one knows at 
the time of arrest that she is arresting an innocent person, while the other knows 
only that, over time, she is arresting innocent people, does not alter aggregate 
outcomes. 
One potentially relevant distinction between S and C arises from the state of 
mind each brings to her job. When S arrests a suspect for whom there is a 0.5 
probability of guilt, the officer believes that the person she is arresting is guilty. 
Such a belief may represent in part a simple “gut” feeling, but such feelings 
(supported by actual facts) are an important and useful part of 
decisionmaking.23 At each arrest, in other words, S has reason to believe that the 
particular person arrested has committed an offense. C, by contrast, knowingly 
arrests innocent people on a regular basis. Each time she faces a pair of people, 
only one of whom has committed a crime, and she decides to arrest both of the 
people and sort things out later, C knows (or believes with confidence) that she 
has in custody a completely innocent person. She has therefore decided to 
sacrifice the liberty and privacy of one innocent suspect to support the 
apprehension and prosecution of a guilty one. The innocent arrestee can 
reasonably accuse C of carrying out a knowing, specific injustice on the basis of 
a cost-benefit analysis. S, on the other hand, can honestly say that she has never 
knowingly arrested an innocent person. Her goal is to arrest only guilty people, 
although her level of certainty essentially guarantees that half of the time, she 
will fall short of her goal. Every time she performs an arrest, she therefore acts 
in subjective good faith toward every individual arrested. She is, in that sense, 
less culpable in connection with the harms that she inflicts on innocent arrestees 
than C is. 
To some degree, however, this description of the police officers’ respective 
behavior is question-begging. It is true that on any given occasion, the statistical 
officer, S, does not knowingly arrest an innocent person, by contrast to the 
concrete officer, C. If a person is a repeat player, however, as a police officer 
who arrests large numbers of suspects over time is, then the fact that the officer 
may—on any given occasion—be doing no harm matters far less. Over time, in 
other words, the officer knows that she is arresting innocent people, as many 
 
 23. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How 
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 19–29 (2007) (describing evidence of judges’ intuitive 
decisionmaking). 
COLB_PROOF.DOC 12/20/2010  11:20:41 AM 
78 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 73:69 
innocent people as her colleague C is arresting. On a one-time basis, then, it 
may be sensible to distinguish certain harm to an innocent from the probability 
of such harm. But police do not act on a one-time basis and must therefore be 
understood to take responsibility for the known outcomes that their conduct 
foreseeably produces. There is knowledge, in other words, in both S and C. The 
knowledge is simply statistical for S and concrete for C. 
So the question arises again: Is there a morally salient difference between 
statistical and concrete harm? 
B.  A Distinct but Related Phenomenon 
Before venturing further, it is worth noting a related but distinct 
phenomenon in people’s reactions to statistical versus concrete information: the 
difficulty that people (and therefore jurors) seem to have when they are asked 
to process evidence that is general and statistical in nature rather than specific 
and concrete about the particular parties. 
The classic case of this phenomenon is known in evidence circles as the 
“blue bus case”:24 A plaintiff was hit by a blue bus; the defendant owns eighty 
percent of the blue buses operating in the relevant area.25 When evidence 
students confront this case, most are not satisfied that by citing the above facts 
the plaintiff has proven his case against the defendant.26 People want to hear 
evidence that seems to be about the particular bus that hit the plaintiff, such as 
a dent on the right side or a driver wearing a “Go Yankees” sweatshirt. The 
more such details about the particular tortfeasor, the better, despite the fact 
that, for each such “specific” detail, there will be some number of innocent 
matches in the population (for example, other buses with dents, other drivers 
with Yankees sweatshirts), and the probative value of the details will therefore 
turn, ultimately, on the product of the proportions of each characteristic in the 
population, a product that may well fall short of the simple but overwhelming 
odds that any blue bus belonged to the defendant.27 
 
 24. See Charles R. Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of 
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1378–79 (1985) (recounting the blue-bus hypothetical). The 
hypothetical case is based on Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 58 N.E.2d 754 (Mass. 1945). There the 
defendant operated the only bus line that had a route on the relevant street. Id. at 755. 
 25. Nesson, supra note 24, at 1379. 
 26. See Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the 
Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 986–87 (2006) (“Sometimes naked statistical evidence 
seems intuitively insufficient to justify a judgment. If the only proof that the plaintiff was injured by the 
defendant’s bus instead of another company’s bus was mere evidence that a majority of the blue busses 
in town belonged to the defendant, many of us would hesitate to find that identification sufficient.”). 
 27. See Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy 
Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 247, 263 (1990) 
(“After all, both epistemologically and in most cases practically, how can one ever ‘really’ know 
anything? For example, how can eyewitness testimony convince us that Sally Smith ‘really’ was a 
gatecrasher, rather than that she was probably one? All evidence is probabilistic, requires inferences to 
support an ultimate conclusion, and involves a risk of error if thought to establish that conclusion.”). 
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This negative reaction to statistics might reflect a discomfort with 
mathematics more generally; many people distrust statistical data and find its 
application to particular situations confusing. As a result, it feels “unfair” to 
people to blame the blue bus company for a negligent collision simply because 
it happens to own most of the blue buses in town. People want to know more 
about the particular bus, a desire that some have characterized as irrational.28 
This hostility to statistics appeared to operate as well among the Supreme 
Court Justices who comprised the majority in McCleskey v. Kemp.29 The 
petitioner in that case challenged the constitutionality of his death sentence on 
the ground that it reflected a racially biased sentencing process.30 To prove his 
case, he demonstrated that the primary predictor of whether a defendant is 
sentenced to life imprisonment or death for a particular murder is not the 
severity of the respective murders but, instead, the race of the victim (white) 
and an interaction between the race of the victim and the race of the 
perpetrator (black on white).31 
Such statistics strongly suggested that any African American defendant 
sentenced to death for the murder of a white person has suffered the effects of 
racially biased decisionmaking—or what Professor Randall Kennedy has called 
“selective empathy.”32 Yet the Supreme Court refused to find an equal-
protection violation and insisted that, to show that a death sentence violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment, a defendant would have to prove something specific 
about his jury that suggested discrimination in its deliberations.33 To conclude 
that a particular person or group behaved badly, in other words, the Court—
like students considering the blue bus case—did not feel comfortable relying on 
statistical evidence that seemed not to be about the particular person or group 
accused.34 
 
 28. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Second-Order Evidence and Bayesian Logic, 66 B.U. L. REV. 673, 675–
76 (1986). 
 29. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 295 n.15 (1987) (“[A]ny inference from statewide 
statistics to a prosecutorial ‘policy’ is of doubtful relevance.”). 
 30. Id. at 286. 
 31. Id.; see DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 141 (1990) 
(finding that black defendants who killed white victims have the greatest likelihood of receiving the 
death penalty). 
 32. Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1420 (1988) (“[R]ace-of-the-victim disparities in sentencing [indicated by the 
Baldus study] probably reflect racially selective empathy more than racially selective hostility.”). 
 33. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292–93 (“[T]o prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey 
must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose. He offers no 
evidence specific to his own case that would support an inference that racial considerations played a 
part in his sentence.”). 
 34. People seem to have a similarly difficult time processing evidence that eyewitnesses frequently 
make mistakes in identifying a perpetrator. Despite such evidence, jurors continue to find eyewitness 
identifications compelling and persuasive. See Sherry F. Colb, The Problems of Eyewitness 
Identification: A Personal Account, FINDLAW, Mar. 18, 2009, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ 
colb/20090318.html (reviewing some of the problems with eyewitness identification); see also James 
Lang, Note, Hearsay and Relevancy Obstacles to the Admission of Composite Sketches in Criminal 
Trials, 64 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1138 n.203 (citing psychological studies according to which evidence of 
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Enterprise liability pushes back against the inclination to assess only 
evidence revolving specifically around the particular parties. In the leading case 
of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, a woman brought a lawsuit against a company 
that manufactured a pharmaceutical called diethylstilbestrol (DES).35 The drug 
was prescribed to pregnant women to help them avoid miscarriages, but it 
turned out that DES caused illness and various abnormalities in the children 
born to those women who had taken the drug.36 The woman who brought suit 
had contracted cancer that was apparently caused by her mother’s having taken 
DES.37 She could prove only that her mother had taken the drug and that the 
drug had probably caused her own illness. Because the drug DES was generic, it 
might have been manufactured by one of a number of different pharmaceutical 
companies. 
Rather than dismiss the plaintiff’s suit, as the “blue bus” approach might 
have inclined it to do, however, the court instead announced a cognizable 
theory of “market share liability.”38 Under this theory, a plaintiff who sued a 
group of manufacturers of a defective product, a group representing a 
“substantial share” of the relevant market, could recover damages from each 
defendant in proportion to its relative share of the particular market.39 A 
defendant could defend against this theory of liability by proving affirmatively 
that it could not have been the producer of the particular product consumed by 
the plaintiff. This innovative approach to liability meant that even though 
Abbott Labs could be identified as only one manufacturer of DES and could 
not otherwise be linked to the DES that the plaintiff’s mother had ingested, 
Abbott Labs would still be required to pay a statistically based proportion of 
 
eyewitness identification increased a jury’s willingness to convict from eighteen percent to sixty-eight 
percent even after the eyewitness was discredited by further evidence that his eyesight was 20/400 and 
he had not been wearing his glasses at the time he observed the offender). Courts are often aware of 
this problem. See State v. Hunt, 69 P.3d 571, 576–77 (Kan. 2003) (“[J]uries usually attach great weight 
to eyewitness identification, while others involved in a trial know and other disciplines have 
documented that such identification is often unreliable.”). 
 35. 607 P.2d 924, 925 (Cal. 1980). 
 36. Id. at 926 n.3 (“Plaintiff's failure to amend her complaint after Abbott’s demurrer was 
sustained with leave to amend was based upon her inability to identify a specific manufacturer.”). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 937 (“[W]e hold it to be reasonable in the present context to measure the likelihood that 
any of the defendants supplied the product which allegedly injured plaintiff by the percentage which 
the DES sold by each of them for the purpose of preventing miscarriage bears to the entire production 
of the drug sold by all for that purpose. . . . Each defendant will be held liable for the proportion of the 
judgment represented by its share of that market unless it demonstrates that it could not have made the 
product which caused plaintiff’s injuries. . . . Under this approach, each manufacturer’s liability would 
approximate its responsibility for the injuries caused by its own products.”). 
 39. Id. (“If plaintiff joins in the action the manufacturers of a substantial share of the DES which 
her mother might have taken, the injustice of shifting the burden of proof to defendants to demonstrate 
that they could not have made the substance which injured plaintiff is significantly diminished. While 75 
to 80 percent of the market is suggested as the requirement . . . , we hold only that a substantial 
percentage is required.”). 
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the damages for the plaintiff’s injury.40 In the blue-bus-case analogue, this 
theory would have required the defendant company to pay eighty percent of the 
plaintiff’s damages. Even though this approach distinguishes statistical from 
concrete forms of evidence (the latter of which allow for one hundred percent 
recovery against a defendant, despite only a fifty-one percent chance of 
liability), it does not dismiss the former out of hand for lack of concrete 
evidence. 
The evident hostility to statistical versus concrete evidence bears a relation 
to the tendency to place greater weight on concrete than on statistical harms. 
Like a concrete victim of harm, concrete evidence may feel more “real” and 
thus worthy of being taken into account by people who learn of its existence. I 
would nonetheless distinguish between the two sorts of dichotomies. In the 
blue-bus and related examples,41 judges and juries want to receive information 
that distinguishes particular parties from the crowd of individuals who might be 
responsible for a particular injury. In this desire, they fail to appreciate fully 
that uncertainty is uncertainty and that, therefore, any evidence that does not 
conclusively establish the defendant’s responsibility leaves open the possibility 
that he might incorrectly be held liable. Except where the dearth of party-
specific evidence reflects a failure to gather evidence diligently—which might be 
at work in some cases—the distinction is not rational in this context.42 
In the case of approving arrest on the basis of fifty-fifty odds of a suspect’s 
innocence (and disapproving the arrest of two people, one of whom is definitely 
guilty and one of whom is definitely innocent), however, the difficulty judges 
and juries have is not with relying on statistical evidence to draw factual 
 
 40. For similar reasons, the two defendants in Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1948), who both 
shot their guns at the victim at the same time were both held responsible for the victim’s death, even 
though it was impossible to attribute the death distinctly to one rather than the other defendant. Unlike 
in Sindell, of course, there really was not one actual cause in Summers v. Tice—both shooters were 
sufficient conditions for the death, and neither was a necessary condition (in the “but for” causation 
sense). By distributing liability between the two shooters, then, the two people who had caused the 
concrete death would pay equally for the damages, a result that feels “concretely” satisfying and 
requires no comfort with statistical models. 
 41. For a description of the blue-bus scenario, see text accompanying notes 24–28. 
 42. An example is the gatecrasher case described in Cohen, supra note 22, at 627. In the 
gatecrasher scenario, we know that more than half of the 1,000 people who entered a stadium did not 
pay for a ticket, but we do not know anything more specific that would allow us to distinguish between 
the large number of people who did and the even larger number of people who did not pay. Though the 
odds that any one member of the crowd entered without paying are greater than fifty percent in this 
scenario, people faced with the hypothetical facts typically oppose the idea of allowing a jury to award 
damages against an individual in the stadium on the basis of this information. These reactions, however, 
may well reflect impatience with the plaintiff’s failure to watch the door and thereby facilitate the 
discovery of which people in the crowd entered without paying. David Kaye offers a similar 
explanation when he argues that in the gatecrasher case “a factfinder should consider the fact that 
plaintiffs . . . are relying on statistical evidence and nothing more. Unless there is a satisfactory 
explanation for the plaintiffs’ failure to do more than present the gross statistic, a rational juror might 
well arrive at a subjective probability of less than one-half that the defendant was one of the 501 
gatecrashers.” David Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 101, 
106 (1979). 
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conclusions. The difficulty is instead with drawing normative conclusions on the 
basis of statistical (though certain) factual harms. Rather than feel (perhaps 
irrationally) that they have not received enough evidence to prove a contested 
fact, then, people feel instead that the statistical harm that has been proven 
does not amount to the same morally troubling matter that a comparable 
concrete harm would. Whether or not statistical evidence qualifies as adequate 
(or even admissible) proof in a court of law, then, judges and juries may tend to 
view the proven harms differently, as a normative matter, depending on 
whether they are concrete or statistical in their certain impact. 
III 
STATISTICAL VERSUS CONCRETE HARMS IN OTHER AREAS 
In the context of defining probable cause, we still do not know whether the 
Supreme Court endorses the intuition that arresting two people, one of whom is 
innocent and one of whom is guilty, is constitutionally distinct from arresting 
one person for whom the probability of guilt is 0.5. The Court has, however, 
had occasion to speak (both directly and indirectly) to the statistical–concrete 
divide in other legal contexts. In examining these areas, let us begin with a 
different Fourth Amendment question, the role of the exclusionary rule in 
handling the products of searches that were not based upon probable cause. 
A. Statistical Versus Concrete Harms in Fourth Amendment Suppression 
One can readily identify the clashes of perceived concrete and statistical 
harms in liberals’ and conservatives’ discussions of the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule. On the liberal side, past Justices such as Brennan and 
Marshall have contended that when a prosecutor introduces the fruits of an 
unreasonable search or seizure into evidence at trial, the prosecutor has 
inflicted a further constitutional harm on the defendant who suffered the 
original unlawful search or seizure.43 That is, according to these Justices, 
participants in the courtroom process violate a concrete defendant’s 
constitutional rights by introducing against him the evidence taken without a 
warrant or probable cause. Just as the defendant had a right not to have police 
perform the search or seizure in the first place, he now has the right not to have 
to endure the courtroom consequences that would follow from the 
unreasonable search or seizure. A straightforward application of the Fifth 
Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination, for example, would 
similarly bar the introduction of a tortured terrorist’s statements at the criminal 
trial of that terrorist.44 
 
 43. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 935 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“For my part, 
‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures’ comprises a personal right to exclude all evidence secured by means of 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”). 
 44. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 557–58 (1897) (holding that the Fifth Amendment 
requires exclusion of statements given in response to coercive interrogation); Marcy Strauss, Torture, 
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Conservatives and even some liberals, however, have taken the position that 
a Fourth Amendment violation begins and ends with the unreasonable search 
and seizure and that the introduction of resulting evidence at trial does not itself 
violate anyone’s constitutional rights.45 If this is true—and it is the position of a 
majority of our current Supreme Court that it is46—then allowing prosecutors to 
introduce illegally searched or seized evidence inflicts no new constitutional 
harm on the defendant himself, but instead causes harm only to people who in 
the future will be subject to illegal searches or seizures because police are not 
deterred and do not fear that such conduct will lead to the suppression of 
evidence that they find.47 Under this approach, though the defendant will not 
like the introduction of the evidence, he is not entitled to its exclusion. The 
people who suffer a cognizable harm are as yet undetermined, because they will 
be subject to undeterred Fourth Amendment violations in the future. They are 
thus statistical (albeit real) victims of the failure to suppress evidence and, as 
such, do not inspire very much outrage in the population.48 By contrast, within 
this framework, the harm of excluding evidence is quite concrete. To 
paraphrase Justice Cardozo, is the criminal to go free because the constable has 
 
48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 248 (2004). This may help explain why the federal government has been 
quite reluctant to place most terrorism-related detainees on trial in criminal court. See Tung Yin, 
Ending the War on Terrorism One Terrorist at a Time: A Noncriminal Detention Model for Holding and 
Releasing Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 176–77 (2005) (suggesting that 
the government’s choice of military tribunals was motivated in part by the inadmissibility of evidence 
obtained through coercive interrogation). 
 45. See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (“[T]he use of fruits of past unlawful search or seizure ‘[works] 
no new Fourth Amendment wrong’” (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974))); see 
also Sherry F. Colb, Kansas v. Ventris: The Supreme Court Misconstrues the Right to Counsel, 
FINDLAW, June 10, 2009, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20090610.html (discussing the significance 
of when a violation took place, in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment contexts). 
 46. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 699 (2009) (“The Fourth Amendment . . . ‘contains 
no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands.’” (quoting 
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995))). 
 47. The Court, of course, regularly denies that there is even this cost to future search victims when 
illegally obtained evidence is admitted. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596 (2006) (“It 
seems to us not even true, as Hudson contends, that without suppression there will be no deterrence of 
knock-and-announce violations at all.”); Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 704 (2009) (“[W]hen 
police mistakes are the result of negligence such as that described here, rather than systemic error or 
reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, any marginal deterrence does not ‘pay its way.’”). In 
Hudson, police arrived at the defendant’s home with a search warrant for drugs and firearms. They 
announced their presence but waited only a short time before opening the unlocked door and entering 
the defendant’s home. Inside the home they discovered large quantities of drugs and a gun. The Court 
determined that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable and suppression of the evidence was not 
warranted. In Herring, police arrested the defendant after failing to update a computer database to 
reflect the recall of the arrest warrant. The Court found that the mistake was due to negligence and that 
error, by itself, was insufficient to require exclusion under the Fourth Amendment. 
 48. It is possible that people are not outraged because they do not realize that the exclusionary rule 
has been watered down. One study suggests that a majority of the public supports the exclusionary rule, 
see SHMUEL LOCK, CRIME, PUBLIC OPINION, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE TOLERANT PUBLIC 45 
(1999) (showing that, across all levels of education, less than thirty-five percent of those surveyed were 
likely to allow illegally obtained material into evidence), although it is difficult to assess whether people 
like it in theory but find it offensive and undesirable in concrete cases, an approach that would seem to 
mirror the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence (which has yet to overrule exclusion altogether). 
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blundered?49 The harm is hampering the prosecution of an ostensibly guilty 
person. When a guilty person gets away with his crime—and we are aware of 
this fact (as we are when an otherwise compelling case against a defendant is 
thrown out because of a “technicality”)—we feel outraged and affronted by the 
concrete miscarriage of justice. 
One could, however, characterize things quite differently. One might argue, 
as some law-enforcement liberals do, that the only “harm” that occurs when 
evidence is suppressed is that, over time, when guilty people remain at large, 
some number of them reoffend and hurt new victims. The failure to punish a 
particular crime does not itself “victimize” anyone (including the past victim) 
because neither crime victims nor any other individuals are entitled to punish 
the defendant. In fact, the reason criminal cases are described as “People v. X” 
is that the party opposing the defendant is not an individual person or victim 
but rather the government, which can decide whether to even prosecute a 
particular defendant. Viewed in this way, the harm of a wrongful acquittal is not 
concrete at all. 
Under the Brennan–Marshall view, the cost of introducing the unlawfully 
obtained evidence is correspondingly concrete because the latter inflicts harm 
on the defendant in the case. It is because of this harm that defendants are 
willing to invest resources in arguing their Fourth Amendment claims in 
motions in limine, and it is also because of this harm that a lawyer who fails to 
bring an obvious suppression motion is said to deny the defendant the effective 
assistance of counsel for Sixth Amendment purposes.50 Unlike the as-yet-
unknown victims who will fall prey to the defendant’s recidivism if he is 
released without punishment, the defendant’s harm is concrete and specific to 
him. 
Examined closely, the arguments over the exclusionary rule are, in at least 
one sense, mirror images of each other. On one side of the mirror, people who 
oppose suppression in a given case view the failure to punish private criminal 
misconduct—through successful prosecution, conviction, and sentencing—as a 
concrete harm to crime victims whose rights the defendant violated in 
committing his crime. In keeping with the parallel, opponents of the 
exclusionary rule view the “harm” of incomplete Fourth Amendment 
deterrence as itself statistical (that is, connected to future unknown people to be 
searched and seized without justification) and subject to mitigation by partial 
enforcement and alternative remedies (including § 1983 suits).51 On the other 
 
 49. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (“The criminal is to go free because the 
constable has blundered.”). 
 50. See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 383–87 (1986) (holding that an attorney’s 
unreasonable failure to file a suppression motion for evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel). 
 51. As some have noted, one asset of a § 1983 suit, as compared to suppression, is that an innocent 
person is particularly well situated to make use of such a remedy. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth 
Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 797–98, 812–14 (explaining that suppression 
benefits the guilty and arguing for direct government-entity liability under § 1983 as the solution); see 
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side, some people view the failure to “punish” violations of the Fourth 
Amendment through the exclusionary rule as concrete harms against the people 
whose Fourth Amendment rights were initially violated.52 By contrast, the 
perpetrator’s victims have already suffered their injustice at the time of the 
crime (and therefore cannot be said to suffer cognizable “victimization” when a 
prosecution is dismissed). Therefore, the only people seriously harmed by 
suppression are the potential (and accordingly abstract and indeterminate) 
future victims of an unpunished criminal. 
Viewed through the statistical–concrete lens, then, we can see why those 
who debate the exclusionary rule seem to talk past one another. It is not so 
much that proponents believe unreasonable searches and seizures are 
qualitatively worse than crime or that opponents believe that the government 
can do no wrong (though there may be members of each camp who take these 
positions). Instead, people on opposite sides may conceive of the harms 
inflicted by intrusive government officials and by criminals differently, in a 
manner that leads them to find exclusion either necessary to avoid concrete 
Fourth Amendment violations or contrary to the concrete rights of victims and 
society in retribution. 
It is noteworthy that the pro-defendant view of exclusion has been far less 
popular and appealing than the pro-government (anti-exclusion) view. This is 
 
also Jon O. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy 
for Law Enforcer’s Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 449 n.6 (1983) (arguing that unlike “the guilty person 
whose conviction is precluded by the exclusionary rule [and who] has, in a sense, obtained a ‘remedy’ 
for the violation of his rights,” the exclusionary rule provides no remedy to the innocent). 
 52. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (holding that “the exclusionary rule is an essential part 
of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments”); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462 (1928) 
(“The striking outcome of the Weeks Case and those which followed it was the sweeping declaration 
that the Fourth Amendment, although not referring to or limiting the use of evidence in courts, really 
forbade its introduction, if obtained by government officers through a violation of the amendment.”); 
Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S. 530, 532 (1926) (“If the search and seizure are unlawful as invading 
personal rights secured by the Constitution those rights would be infringed yet further if the evidence 
were allowed to be used.”); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391–92 (1914) (“[T]he Fourth 
Amendment . . . put the courts of the United States . . . in the exercise of their power and authority, 
under limitations and restraints [and] . . . forever secure[d] the people, their persons, houses, papers 
and effects against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law.”); see also Colb, supra 
note 11, at 1524 (arguing that even in the case of a guilty defendant, “[t]hough [he] does not deserve to 
be free of punishment, he has still suffered the harm of being punished without a procedurally sound 
determination of his guilt”); see generally Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule 
Rest on a "Principled Basis” Rather Than an "Empirical Proposition”?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565 
(1983). According to Kamisar, “[t]he likely explanation for the failure of the Fourth Amendment to 
provide explicitly for an ‘exclusionary rule’ is that the framers thought little, if at all, about after the fact 
judicial control.” Id. at 578. 
  The Court’s decision in Weeks seems to recognize two potential constitutional violations: one 
by the court in admitting the evidence and one by the police in obtaining it illegally. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 
393–94 (“The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as 
they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor 
and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.”). 
  In addition to the concrete harm to defendants, proponents of exclusion may also worry about 
the future statistical harm that such failures to enforce the Constitution will inflict on as-yet-unknown 
people to be searched. 
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likely because the guilty defendant on whom evidence is found through an 
illegal search is—in a fundamental sense—just as deserving of punishment as 
any other guilty defendant on whom evidence is found.53 Stated differently, the 
guilty defendant would, if he had gone undetected due to state compliance with 
Fourth Amendment requirements, have been an incidental beneficiary of a 
Fourth Amendment privacy and liberty right that, by its own terms, is designed 
to protect innocent people. Blocking the search of a secretly guilty defendant, 
for that reason, is not an intended objective but rather a necessary cost of 
protecting the many innocent people who would otherwise be vulnerable to 
police searches. Viewing the defendant who moved to suppress evidence as a 
surrogate for future privacy victims (rather than as a potential victim in his own 
right) thus better reflects intuitive reactions to the Fourth Amendment. And to 
the extent that it does, the harm—of introducing the evidence (and failing to 
deter future violations against unknown and as-yet-undetermined parties)—is 
accordingly abstract and statistical, by contrast to the concrete harm of possibly 
releasing a guilty defendant. 
Critics of the exclusionary rule have long pointed out the perverse nature of 
suppressing evidence in a criminal case as a “remedy” for Fourth Amendment 
violations.54 The most vicious crime of all will yield the greatest payoff for the 
defendant who successfully suppresses incriminating evidence—avoiding a life 
sentence or the death penalty. The small-time criminal, by contrast, may avoid a 
few years (or less) behind bars. And the completely innocent person who 
suffers an unreasonable search or seizure that turns up nothing incriminating 
gets nothing from application of the exclusionary rule (other than the shared, 
and thus diffuse and statistical, benefit of deterred future violations of the 
Fourth Amendment). To focus on the concrete, as people are inclined to do, is 
to view the suppression of evidence as a concrete, present, and disturbing 
reward that grows in direct proportion to the misdeeds of its undeserving 
beneficiary. 
The Supreme Court, in supporting and applying an exclusionary rule, 
purports to treat it accordingly, as a means of deterring future Fourth 
Amendment violations rather than as a reward or direct compensation for the 
 
 53. See Colb, supra note 11, at 1468–73 (elaborating a hypothetical case to support this argument). 
 54. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 51, at 797 (“[I]f deterrence is the key, the idea is to make the 
government pay, in some way, for its past misdeeds, in order to discourage future ones. But why should 
that payment flow to the guilty? Under the exclusionary rule, the more guilty you are, the more you 
benefit.”); L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It’s Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule: A New 
and Extensive Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and a Call for a Civil Administrative Remedy to 
Partially Replace the Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 752 (1998) (“The exclusionary rule bestows the 
greatest benefit on those accused of the most heinous crimes (and thus facing the most severe 
sentences) and not those who suffer the most significant injury.”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the 
Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 18 (2003) (“‘The criminal is to go free because 
the constable has blundered’ is the rallying cry.”); Patrick Tinsley, N. Stephan Kinsella & Walter Block, 
In Defense of Evidence and Against the Exclusionary Rule: A Libertarian Approach, 32 S.U. L. REV. 63, 
71 (2004) (“[T]he exclusionary rule gives rights to the guilty they do not deserve and does nothing for 
innocent victims of illegal searches.”). 
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criminal defendant who invokes it at trial.55 The benefit of mandated exclusion 
is therefore a statistical benefit, and the harm or cost is concrete. Yet this 
approach to exclusion clashes with the fact that the Court also requires criminal 
defendants to have Fourth Amendment “standing” before they may move to 
suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. This means 
that whatever Fourth Amendment violation occurred must have specifically 
violated the moving defendant’s rights as a prerequisite to her ability to exclude 
the evidence at her trial. 
It does not make sense, on the one hand, to rest a doctrine of exclusion on 
future deterrence (rather than on a personal entitlement to suppression) and 
then, on the other, to limit access to exclusion to just those people who have 
individually suffered Fourth Amendment violations.56 If exclusion is no one’s 
entitlement, then the criminal defendant whose own Fourth Amendment rights 
were violated is in no better a position to take advantage of it than is a criminal 
defendant whose codefendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated. And 
if the entire purpose of exclusion is future deterrence, then it cannot help but 
undermine that deterrence to limit the universe of people who can act (as a 
surrogate) to prevent the state from viewing Fourth Amendment violation as a 
profitable endeavor. 
One possible explanation that the statistical–concrete distinction offers for 
the Court’s self-contradictory exclusionary-rule policy is that, regardless of the 
doctrine (which is built on the intuitively appealing notion that exclusion is 
meant to prevent future violations rather than to compensate a particular 
criminal defendant), an individual who comes into court and asks for 
suppression is the most salient, concrete beneficiary of the exclusionary rule 
and thus outshines the many innocent people who will benefit indirectly from 
the Fourth Amendment compliance that will result from exclusion. Because the 
criminal defendant is the salient beneficiary in such a case, it “feels” especially 
wrong and windfall-like to award the defendant this undeserved benefit when 
he has not even himself suffered a Fourth Amendment harm. To put this more 
crudely, the defendant who moves to suppress evidence under the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule is necessarily a kind of parasite—denying the 
jury the truth it is entitled to hear for his own selfish gain. So the Court, already 
repelled by the parasite, demands that it be an aggrieved parasite. Then, at least, 
there is some sense that this particular defendant is entitled to relief, though the 
foundation of exclusion, under current doctrine, is that he has no such 
entitlement. 
 
 55. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (“[T]he exclusionary rule is neither 
intended nor able to ‘cure the invasion of the defendant’s right which he has already suffered.’ The rule 
thus operates as ‘a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally 
through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.’” 
(citation omitted)). 
 56. See Sherry F. Colb, Standing Room Only: Why Fourth Amendment Exclusion and Standing Can 
No Longer Logically Coexist, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663, 1694–96 (2007). 
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This logical inconsistency suggests that the Court may simply be incapable 
of moving away from the idea that the defendant who brings a suppression 
motion is seeking a form of compensation, despite its explicit denial of this 
model of exclusion. The concrete reality for the Court is a specific person (a 
defendant) who moves to suppress probative evidence of his guilt, from which 
suppression he stands to gain. The innocent people who will benefit from any 
resulting Fourth Amendment compliance are statistical, abstract, and therefore 
less compelling characters in the unfolding drama. Viewing exclusion as 
compensation, then, the Court concludes that the defendant must therefore 
have suffered a loss for which such compensation is due. The statistical–
concrete disparity thus accounts for what is otherwise an incoherent 
requirement for Fourth Amendment standing. 
B. Statistical Versus Concrete Harms and Disparate-Impact Discrimination 
Application of the statistical–concrete disparity is not limited to Fourth 
Amendment doctrine. In June 2009, the Supreme Court decided Ricci v. 
DeStefano,57 in which it considered the New Haven Fire Department’s decision 
not to follow through on its procedure to select applicants for promotion. The 
department had given promotion applicants a pencil-and-paper test as one part 
of the evaluation process. Had the department certified the test results, none of 
the three people actually promoted would have been African American, and a 
starkly disproportionate number of the people who passed the test would have 
been white. To avoid this disparate impact, the department decided not to 
certify the results of the test and accordingly not to promote the people who 
had received qualifying scores.58 The white firefighters who had performed well 
on the test then sued the department under Title VII and the Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection Clause, arguing that the department had 
discriminated against them on the basis of race, in violation of both statutory 
and constitutional law. The alleged discrimination consisted of denying them, 
on the basis of their race, the promotions that they had earned through their 
test scores. 
The department countered that it had thrown out the test because it would 
otherwise have been vulnerable to suit under Title VII for “disparate impact” 
discrimination, in which an employer uses an apparently neutral test that 
disproportionately disfavors a particular racial (or otherwise impermissibly 
classified) group. Both the district court and the court of appeals found in favor 
of the defendant, the department, and ruled that refusing to certify the test did 
not constitute illegal discrimination.59 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit and ruled that the department had unlawfully 
 
 57. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
 58. Id. at 2664. 
 59. Id. at 2671–72. 
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discriminated against the qualifying firefighters on the basis of race, in violation 
of Title VII. The department was not permitted to do so, according to the 
Court, even if it had simply been trying to avoid a disparate-impact lawsuit, in 
the absence of a strong basis in evidence for believing it would lose such a suit, 
if it were brought.60 Otherwise, if the test had been projected to have an 
undesirable racial impact, the Court suggested, the employer could have 
replaced or modified it before anyone had taken the test and passed (or failed) 
it.61 Now that specific, existing people had already taken the test and thereby 
qualified for (or became disqualified from) promotions, the department could 
not, under Title VII, ignore the test results simply to avoid awarding too many 
promotions to white people. The Court deferred consideration of the equal-
protection question: whether a government actor’s consciously employing racial 
criteria to avoid a disparate-impact suit is unconstitutional, regardless of what 
Title VII might allow. It decided the issue solely on the basis of Title VII.62 
Whether or not one agrees with the outcome of Ricci, the distinction the 
Court drew—between scrapping the test before it is given to anyone and 
scrapping it after people have taken and passed or failed it—exposes once again 
the intuitively appealing (but doctrinally elusive) line we draw between 
statistical and concrete harms, respectively. 
When an employer selects a test for determining whom to promote, she can 
discover whether the test will produce a racially disparate impact in one of three 
ways. First, she can simply give her employees the test and see what happens: if 
the test disproportionately qualifies white people for promotion, the employer 
has now learned of the disparate impact. This appears to be what happened in 
Ricci. Second, an employer can give the test as a “practice” or otherwise 
noncounting measure to some of her employees (or to a group of people 
demographically and professionally similar to her employees) and find out what 
happens. If the results reveal a racial or other disparate impact, she has now 
learned of that impact. Third, she can ask testing experts or other similar 
employers who have used the particular test in the past and find out whether 
they have found that it results in a racially disparate impact. 
Once the employer learns, in one of these three ways, of the test’s tendency 
to produce a disparate impact, she might decide in the future to use a different 
measure for promotion. According to Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in 
Ricci, such a step would apparently be fine, even though the employer’s reason 
for rejecting the test is its foreseeable, racially disparate impact. What would not 
 
 60. Id. at 2677 (“[U]nder Title VII, before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for 
the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must 
have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take 
the race-conscious, discriminatory action.”). 
 61. Id. (“Title VII does not prohibit an employer from considering, before administering a test or 
practice, how to design that test or practice in order to provide a fair opportunity for all individuals, 
regardless of their race.”). 
 62. Id. at 2681. 
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be fine (absent a “strong basis in evidence” for worrying about losing a 
disparate-impact lawsuit) is discarding the test after applicants have taken it. 
What, exactly, distinguishes permissible from impermissible approaches? It 
cannot be the presence or absence of a racial motive: in both cases, by 
hypothesis, the employer is choosing to forgo the particular test, whether 
“before administering” it, during the test-design stage, or once it has been 
given, because of the racial disparities that the test has produced or will 
produce. But for that racial disparity, in other words, the employer would use 
the test. It is thus somewhat misleading for Justice Kennedy to suggest that 
what made respondent’s conduct illegal was the racial motive. In fact, the Court 
reveals a distinct concern: 
The injury arises in part from the high, and justified, expectations of the candidates 
who had participated in the testing process on the terms the City had established for 
the promotional process. Many of the candidates had studied for months, at 
considerable personal and financial expense, and thus the injury caused by the City’s 
reliance on raw racial statistics at the end of the process was all the more severe.63 
Apparently, then, what distinguishes permissible from impermissible 
approaches is the degree to which the respective approaches’ victims (those who 
would qualify for promotion under the test but who will not be promoted) are 
determinate and concrete, as opposed to as-yet-undetermined and statistical. If 
an employer chooses not to adopt an available promotion test in order to avoid 
racial disparities, in other words, then neither he nor we can ever know which 
white promotion applicants would have qualified for promotions under the test 
(but will now miss that opportunity). The difference between the two scenarios 
therefore has nothing to do with racial intent and everything to do with the 
distinction between statistical and concrete harms. 
It is important to remember here that if an employer had decided to use a 
rejected test, notwithstanding its known racially disparate impact, then there 
would have been actual white people who would have been awarded 
promotions. These people, by virtue of their employer’s decision not to use the 
particular test, therefore “lost” promotions that they would otherwise have 
received. These “losses,” moreover, resulted directly from the employer’s desire 
to avoid a racially disparate impact. 
The decisive difference between this and the actual Ricci case, then, appears 
to be that the white employees who would have been promoted (and thus 
rewarded for their expense and preparation) but for the rejection, pre-testing, 
of a disparate-impact-producing test are not identified, and the employer would 
never have been in a position to know which employees they were. As in the 
context of the exclusionary rule, then, it appears that for the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the concrete reality of a specific, known individual is more powerful—
and morally compelling—than the knowledge that such individuals would have 
existed under the alternate, permissible approach. 
 
 63. Id. at 2681. 
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Interestingly, then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor did not anticipate the Court’s 
willingness to differentiate between concrete and statistical harms when she 
joined the Second Circuit’s per curiam opinion in Ricci v. DeStefano.64 The 
Second Circuit had upheld the New Haven Fire Department’s decision to scrap 
the promotion test on the basis of the racial disparities it produced.65 As Justice 
Ginsburg stated in her dissent from Ricci, the Second Circuit had precedent 
whose outcome resembled (and, according to Justice Ginsburg, compelled) the 
result in Ricci.66 
That precedent was Hayden v. County of Nassau.67 Though Hayden involved 
an employer’s taking a potential test’s disparate impact into account before 
officially giving any test (that is, the test selected was designed specifically to 
avoid disparate impact), neither Justice Ginsburg nor, apparently, then-Judge 
Sotomayor believed this distinction carried any weight. The crucial thing was 
that “[u]nder Second Circuit precedent, the District Court explained, ‘the intent 
to remedy the disparate impact’ of a promotional exam ‘is not equivalent to an 
intent to discriminate against non-minority applicants.’”68 Believing that there 
was no need to elaborate on any distinction between pre-implementation and 
post-implementation consideration of disparate impact, the Second Circuit 
simply issued a per curiam opinion when the latter case came up in Ricci. It thus 
appears that neither Judge Sotomayor nor Justice Ginsburg understood there to 
be a great distinction between the pre-exam, disparate-impact-avoiding 
selection of a promotion test on the one hand, and a post-exam, disparate-
impact-avoiding disposal of a promotion test on the other. 
Justice Kennedy and a majority of the Court, however, would evidently 
have distinguished between Hayden and Ricci, feeling that real-life, present 
victims take precedence over statistical, future ones, even if the latter are as 
certain and perhaps more numerous than the former. This suggests that even 
New Haven itself—the respondent that lost in Ricci—may now throw out the 
disparate-impact-producing promotional exam at issue in Ricci for the future, 
and for the same reason (to avoid disparate impact), once it has promoted the 
specific people who performed well in the last, litigated administration of the 
test. 
The Supreme Court appeared to embrace a similar distinction between 
statistical and concrete harms in an older case about avoiding stark, racially 
disparate impact, Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.69 In Wygant, a 
collective-bargaining agreement had provided for a system of teacher layoffs in 
which seniority would be dominant. That is, people would be laid off, when 
layoffs were necessary, in reverse-seniority order, with the most junior person 
 
 64. Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 65. Id. at 102. 
 66. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2695–96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 67. 180 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 68. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2696 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Hayden, 180 F.3d at 51). 
 69. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
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losing her job first.70 The agreement set out to provide, however, for avoiding 
what would otherwise have been a necessary outcome of seniority-based 
layoffs: the reinstatement of a legacy of prior intentional discrimination with a 
disproportionately white set of teachers. 
To avoid this problem, the agreement had the employer laying off no more 
minority candidates than would retain the present minority–majority 
proportion.71 This approach respected seniority, in other words, but took 
measures to address the impact of seniority on minorities, because, otherwise, 
seniority would necessarily disfavor those who were previously excluded and 
only recently hired on an equal basis. 
The Supreme Court in Wygant held this modified-seniority approach 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.72 It specifically invalidated 
a policy of laying people off on the basis of race, even in a case in which the 
putatively nonracial criterion at issue—seniority—favored white people 
precisely because of a history of invidious racial exclusion. Though the Court 
did recognize the role of prior societal discrimination in contributing to a 
disproportionately white seniority rank, it said that “[s]ocietal discrimination, 
without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified 
remedy.”73 Additionally, the Court said, “We have previously expressed concern 
over the burden that a preferential layoffs scheme imposes on innocent 
parties.”74 In other words, the Court found offensive the specific, concrete harm 
that particular, “innocent” white people—people who would otherwise have 
been retained—must suffer. 
By contrast with lay-off schemes, so-called hiring goals aimed at curing 
racial disproportion struck the Wygant Court as far less troubling. The Court 
explained, 
In cases involving valid hiring goals, the burden to be borne by innocent individuals is 
diffused to a considerable extent among society generally. Though hiring goals may 
burden some innocent individuals, they simply do not impose the same kind of injury 
that layoffs impose. Denial of a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive as 
loss of an existing job.75 
What makes the two different? The difference rests on what economists 
have called the “endowment effect,” the fact that people feel worse about losing 
something they consider “theirs” than they do about not getting something they 
 
 70. Id. at 270 (“‘In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the number of teachers through 
layoff from employment by the Board, teachers with the most seniority in the district shall be retained . 
. . .’”). 
 71. Id. (explaining that “except that at no time will there be a greater percentage of minority 
personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the 
layoff”). 
 72. Id. at 284. 
 73. Id. at 276. 
 74. Id. at 282. 
 75. Id. at 282–83. 
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do not yet have.76 This explains, for example, why people seem to feel less 
hesitant about taking risks when the downside is not getting something 
additional rather than losing something they already have, even though—in 
some sense—the distinction is not entirely rational (because lost opportunities 
are real losses of what one could have had).77 
In thus embracing the endowment effect in Wygant, the Court was counting 
more heavily the losses of people who had brought the Wygant case and who 
were concrete and known “victims” of the minority-retention policy than it was 
the statistical and therefore abstract (but also real) victims of minority-hiring 
goals. Minority-hiring goals, if implemented, would, of course, result in white 
people’s not receiving jobs they would otherwise, by hypothesis, have received. 
But such people would remain—in their particularity—unknown to the Court 
(and, in all likelihood, to themselves as well). The Court was thus able to say of 
them that “hiring goals may burden some innocent individuals,”78 thus 
downplaying the disappointment of unknown but equally real people who had 
hoped and qualified for jobs they would not receive as a result of a racial hiring 
goal, relative to the concrete people who would be subject to lay-offs under the 
employer’s plan. In this sense, the Court seemed to take account of how it 
would feel to know that one has lost one’s job because of one’s race, relative to 
failing to get a job for which the reasons are inevitably more complicated and 
accordingly likely to be unknown by the relevant “victim.” 
C. Statistical Versus Concrete Harms in the Death-Penalty Area 
In the criminal-procedure context, appreciating the role of the statistical–
concrete dimension of moral reasoning can help illuminate another, otherwise-
puzzling decision by the Supreme Court in Herrera v. Collins.79 This case 
presented the question whether it violates the Constitution to execute a person 
who is actually innocent of the crime for which he was duly convicted. Herrera 
had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death years earlier, and his 
conviction had become final, but he allegedly had new evidence demonstrating 
his innocence. Apart from his claim of “actual innocence,” which was modified 
with the word “actual” to distinguish it from entitlement to an acquittal in the 
first instance in spite of actual guilt, Herrera did not have a live procedural 
claim that his conviction or sentence was unconstitutional.80 
 
 76. E.g., Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment 
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 194 (1991). 
 77. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1483–84 (1998) (describing the endowment effect as an irrational 
tendency); see also Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the 
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1326–28 (1990) (summarizing 
psychological studies of the endowment effect). 
 78. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 282 (1986) (emphasis added). 
 79. 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
 80. Id. at 393. 
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The Supreme Court denied Herrera the right to an evidentiary hearing at 
which he could have attempted to persuade a judge of his innocence. The 
ground for this denial was that the evidence Herrera purported to have was not 
sufficiently persuasive, on its face, to make his innocence very probable.81 The 
Court did not say specifically that it was constitutionally acceptable to execute 
innocent people but only that, even if it is not acceptable, a litigant would 
nonetheless have no right to a hearing at which he might prove his innocence if 
his purported evidence looked no more promising than Herrera’s. 
A majority of Justices hinted, in concurring opinions, that they believed that 
a person would have the right to an innocence hearing and would accordingly 
have the right not to be executed if he could make a persuasive showing that he 
did not commit the capital crime for which he was convicted and sentenced.82 
Herrera was simply the wrong vehicle for announcing such a right because his 
claim of innocence was so weak. For Justice Scalia, however, the notion of a 
constitutional right against execution of the innocent did not make any sense. 
By Justice Scalia’s lights, the Constitution provides a variety of procedural 
rights to accused criminals. Many of these rights are, in the end, intended to 
separate the innocent from the guilty. Ideally, having an attorney’s assistance, a 
trial, and a jury will lead to a wise and accurate outcome, one that exonerates 
those who have committed no crime. If a defendant is denied one of these 
entitlements, moreover, he or she has the right to challenge the outcome of the 
trial. The challenge does not consist, however, in a claim that the convicting jury 
or judge reached an incorrect result. The challenge rests instead on the 
argument that the defendant was not given the requisite procedures by which 
accuracy within our constitutional system is achieved.83 
In some sense, Justice Scalia intimated, it would be nonsense to argue that 
an innocent person has the right not to be executed.84 The sparing of innocent 
 
 81. Id. at 417 (“We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this case, that in a capital 
case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial would render the execution 
of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to 
process such a claim. But because of the very disruptive effect that entertaining claims of actual 
innocence would have on the need for finality in capital cases, and the enormous burden that having to 
retry cases based on often stale evidence would place on the States, the threshold showing for such an 
assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high. The showing made by petitioner in this case 
falls far short of any such threshold.”). 
 82. Id. at 419–20 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I cannot disagree with the fundamental legal 
principle that executing the innocent is inconsistent with the Constitution.”); Id. at 442 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (“I would hold that, to obtain relief on a claim of actual innocence, the petitioner must show 
that he probably is innocent.”). 
 83. Id. at 427–28 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“There is no basis in text, tradition, or even in 
contemporary practice (if that were enough) for finding in the Constitution a right to demand judicial 
consideration of newly discovered evidence of innocence brought forward after conviction.”). 
 84. Id. at 428 (“I can understand, or at least am accustomed to, the reluctance of the present Court 
to admit publicly that Our Perfect Constitution lets stand any injustice, much less the execution of an 
innocent man who has received, though to no avail, all the process that our society has traditionally 
deemed adequate. With any luck, we shall avoid ever having to face this embarrassing question again, 
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lives is one major goal of the system, but it is not and cannot be a substantive 
constitutional rule, according to Justice Scalia. One could mock Justice Scalia 
for saying that it is not—and, in fact, cannot be—unconstitutional to execute an 
innocent person. It is difficult to imagine a greater miscarriage of justice than 
the state-sanctioned punitive killing of someone who has done nothing wrong. 
Compared with such an injustice, for example, it seems less significant to deny a 
(guilty) person a trial by jury or to provide a (guilty) person with an ineffective 
attorney. After all, is not the whole reason for having a jury and a lawyer to 
enable an innocent person to escape from wrongful punishment? 
Considering the contrast between Justice Scalia’s focus on procedure and 
the mocking reaction85 to that focus once again illuminates the difference 
between statistical and concrete facts. Justice Scalia is surely right in one sense. 
If we wish to protect the innocent from execution, it makes sense for Justice 
Scalia to focus his energies as a judge on perfecting the process by which our 
system determines guilt and innocence. Process will, over time, maximize the 
odds of justice, and odds add up to real-life, innocent people being acquitted, 
though we do not necessarily know who those people are, if the system is 
functioning well. 
If, in place of process, we were simply to say that “innocent people should 
be freed and guilty people should be punished,” the statement would be empty. 
One must have procedural mechanisms in place to implement substantive goals, 
and it is unclear how—apart from procedure—one could give content to a 
mandate to refrain from executing innocent people. 
As Justice Scalia said in the Sixth Amendment context,86 emphasizing 
substance (for example, the importance of guilt and innocence in determining 
whether a person is punished) risks violating the procedural rights intended to 
achieve substantive justice. As a statistical matter, all we have is a process by 
which we make substantive judgments that, over time, will maximize correct 
outcomes. In fact, it is quite possible that diverting judicial attention to 
 
since it is improbable that evidence of innocence as convincing as today’s opinion requires would fail to 
produce an executive pardon.”). 
 85. Alan M. Dershowitz, Scalia’s Catholic Betrayal, THE DAILY BEAST, Aug. 18, 2009, http:// 
www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-08-18/scalias-catholic-betrayal 
 (“If a defendant were convicted, after a constitutionally unflawed trial, of murdering his wife, and then 
came to the Supreme Court with his very much alive wife at his side, and sought a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence (namely that his wife was alive), these two justices would tell him, in effect: 
‘Look, your wife may be alive as a matter of fact, but as a matter of constitutional law, she’s dead, and 
as for you, Mr. Innocent Defendant, you’re dead, too, since there is no constitutional right not to be 
executed merely because you’re innocent.’”). 
 86. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61–62 (2004) (“Admitting statements deemed 
reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation. To be sure, the Clause’s 
ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive 
guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular 
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only 
about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be little dissent), but about 
how reliability can best be determined. . . . Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is 
obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.”). 
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reviewing evidence of innocence presented by the condemned could have the 
consequence of reducing the care and attention that judges give to ensuring fair 
trials—where most guilt and innocence is likely to be adjudicated. Though the 
particular innocent litigant may be “concrete,” the statistical victims of 
inadequate trials are equally real and likely to be far more numerous. 
If we want to maximize the odds of acquitting innocent people and 
convicting guilty people, in other words, the time and energy we dedicate to 
reexamining and reopening fairly reached convictions and sentences might 
prove to be a poor allocation of limited judicial resources. In the vast majority 
of cases, one hopes, such reexamination would yield no fruit. Better, one could 
argue, to spend extra time ensuring that trials are better truth-seeking 
mechanisms in the first place. 
Yet for many of us, our natural inclination, when we have an actual person 
in front of us, and he has evidence that he is innocent, is to determine what that 
person is individually owed and to do right by him, without thinking very much 
about the implications of such justice for the other “similarly situated” people 
who may come later (and who may consequently get less attention at trial). 
From that perspective, it appears callous for Justice Scalia to say that, regardless 
of how compelling a petitioner’s proof of innocence might be, it is “too bad” for 
him, because he had a fair trial and was denied no procedural rights. To take 
this position seems tantamount to accepting a patent injustice because it is “just 
our policy.” 
The Supreme Court has recently provided some reason to think that it will 
reject Justice Scalia’s refusal to distinguish between statistical and concrete 
harms in the death-penalty context. A condemned prisoner, Troy Davis, 
brought an original petition for habeas corpus to the Supreme Court. In the 
petition, he requested a hearing at which he might prove that he was actually 
innocent of a murder for which he had been convicted years ago.87 Though the 
district court had denied Davis a hearing, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an 
order to the district court, requiring that it allow Davis to present his evidence 
of innocence and that it respond appropriately, depending on the strength of 
the evidence.88 Predictably, Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented from the 
Court’s order.89 But more importantly, the other Justices supported the order.90 
Regardless of whether such hearings might take time away from trials (and 
 
 87. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 88. Id. at 1 (“The District Court should receive testimony and make findings of fact as to whether 
evidence that could not have been obtained at the time of trial clearly establishes petitioner’s 
innocence.”). 
 89. Id. at 3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This Court has never held that the Constitution forbids the 
execution of a convicted defendant who has had a full and fair trial but is later able to convince a 
habeas court that he is ‘actually’ innocent. Quite to the contrary, we have repeatedly left that question 
unresolved, while expressing considerable doubt that any claim based on alleged ‘actual innocence’ is 
constitutionally cognizable.”). 
 90. See id. at 1 (Opinion of the Court, and concurrence written by Justice Stevens, with Justices 
Ginsburg and Breyer joining). 
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thereby increase the number of wrongful convictions of innocent people), the 
Supreme Court was moved by the concrete circumstances of a specific person 
who stood condemned for a crime of which he might very well have been 
innocent. 
D. Statistical Versus Concrete Harm in the Torts Area 
Though references to statistical versus concrete harms are subtle and 
implicit in some of the areas discussed thus far, tort law more directly relies on 
this distinction. In the area of torts, for example, the law explicitly distinguishes 
intentional from negligent misbehavior. Intentionally (which includes both 
purposefully and knowingly) inflicting harm on another is actionable tortious 
behavior such as assault and battery. It is often a violation of the criminal law as 
well.91 We do not, in such cases, ask whether intentionally inflicting harm will 
have beneficial consequences. If I intentionally take blood from a 
nonconsenting patient and use that blood to save a life, I am engaged in an 
unlawful assault and battery, notwithstanding the fact that preserving life is 
arguably more beneficial than nonconsensually taking a patient’s blood is 
harmful. 
Contrast this approach with that entailed in negligence. Doctors routinely 
perform diagnostic and treatment procedures that have both upside and 
downside potential. Many medicines that treat one illness can cause another, 
and some diagnostic interventions can themselves cause pain, illness, or even 
death in some proportion of cases. Over time, moreover, doctors who regularly 
perform such procedures know that some patients will become sick, become 
sicker than they were, or die as a result of the doctor’s actions and 
recommendations. Yet a doctor will not be liable for injuries that result from 
the procedures that she performs unless such procedures are negligent, a term 
that either directly or indirectly entails a cost-benefit calculus. The analysis is 
direct when the standard of negligence is the level of care that maximizes good 
outcomes and minimizes bad outcomes, in the manner of Judge Learned 
Hand’s “BPL” analysis. (“[I]f the probability [of injury] be called P; the [cost of 
the] injury L; and the burden [in dollars of preventing the injury], B; liability 
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B [is less 
than] PL.”)92 The analysis is indirect when we defer to customary medical 
practice, a standard that ostensibly takes into account the positive versus the 
negative effects of medical interventions in determining their advisability.93 To 
 
 91. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.10(1) (Consol. 2010) (defining the crime of assault in the first 
degree as intentionally causing physical injury). 
 92. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.). 
 93. See Neil Meltzer, Comment, Helling v. Carey: Landmark or Exception in Medical Malpractice; 
Compliance with the Medical Standard of Care May Not Protect the Specialist from Liability, 11 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 301, 304–05, 305 n.27 (1975) (noting that the medical profession typically sets its own 
standard of care, and the debate within the profession about glaucoma testing); but see Helling v. 
Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974) (finding liability when medical custom was not supported by 
cost-benefit analysis). 
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put the matter differently, a doctor cannot forcibly take blood, even if the 
benefits will outweigh the costs, but she can perform procedures the net result 
of which will be to cause serious harm to some patients, on the basis of the 
statistical prediction that the procedures will cause greater benefit to other 
patients, over time. 
This distinction within torts is not, moreover, limited to contexts in which 
people give their consent to be subjected to risks. Though a patient might 
willingly assume the risk of illness B in exchange for a better chance of recovery 
from illness A, a negligence standard applies to nonconsensual risks as well. For 
example, driving a car gives rise to a risk of death (to oneself and one’s family 
as well as to others in the path of one’s vehicle), but it also confers benefits. 
Over time, some people will bear the tragic and foreseen costs (by being injured 
or killed or having loved ones injured or killed in car collisions and other 
accidents), while others reap the benefits. Yet driving is legal, and the speed 
limit necessarily takes into account the net benefits of greater speed compared 
with the net costs to life and limb. If the speed limit were to go from 65 mph to 
55 mph, for example, there would be a sizable drop in annual highway 
mortality.94 Yet society has decided that the benefits to those who do not suffer 
the consequences of serious accidents—when added together—outweigh the 
costs to those who do, including the cost of death. 
At the same time, it would not be acceptable knowingly to kill even one 
person to provide benefits to large numbers of other people. One classic 
example is the moral–philosophical dilemma of the doctor who could save five 
patients by removing the vital organs of one healthy person (thereby killing 
him) and giving each organ to another of the five who will die without that 
organ. People seem widely to share the intuition that such an act would be 
morally unacceptable,95 notwithstanding the net positive consequences in terms 
of lives saved. 
With respect to the consequences themselves, however, there is no real 
distinction between (1) selecting a speed limit that will kill X+100 people each 
year but that yields economic and other benefits, rather than choosing the lower 
speed limit that would kill only X people, and (2) killing a healthy patient to 
save the lives and health of five other patients. Indeed, if there is a 
consequential distinction, it may favor the scenario in which the doctor 
sacrifices one person to save five, because a higher speed limit is very unlikely 
 
 94. See Eric Nagourney, Safety: As Speed Limits Rise, So Do Death Tolls, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2009 
at D6 (citing study showing that a ten-mile-per-hour increase in speed limit, from 55 mph to 65 mph, 
was to blame for 12,500 highway deaths over a ten-year period); see also EUROPEAN FEDERATION FOR 
TRANSPORT AND ENVIRONMENT, FACT SHEET: LOWER URBAN SPEED LIMITS (2001), available at 
http://www.transportenvironment.org/Publications/prep_hand_out/lid:132 (showing that even at lower 
speeds, lowering the speed limit from 30 mph to 20 mph lowers the number of accidents by twenty 
percent). 
 95. E.g., LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS: CONUNDRUMS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 35 
(1987); Tom Stacy, Acts, Omissions, and the Necessity of Killing Innocents, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 481, 506 
(2002); Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395, 1396 n.3 (1985). 
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to save five times as many lives as it terminates. On the contrary, the higher 
speed limit will almost certainly produce a higher death rate. 
The main difference that favors the speed limit over the organ thief is that 
the doctor knows at the time of his action that he is killing a concrete, specific 
patient to use him as an organ donor. The legislature setting the speed limit has 
in mind only abstract statistical deaths. 
An illuminating example of the statistical-versus-concrete-harm 
phenomenon is at work in the case of Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.96 The gas 
tank of Ford Pintos had—after release to the market—proved to be subject to 
exploding upon impact at common and foreseeable highway speeds. Ford faced 
a dilemma: it could recall the vehicle and avoid causing the deaths that would 
result from the exploding tank, or it could choose not to recall the vehicle and 
cause the deaths, some of which would result in wrongful-death liability 
payments. Ford chose the latter course. 
A memorandum memorializing this decision lists, on one side, the financial 
loss to Ford if it were to recall the Pinto in question and, on the other side, the 
financial cost of having to pay wrongful-death judgments.97 During a subsequent 
wrongful-death suit against Ford, the memorandum came to light (through 
discovery) and led the jury in the case to award severe punitive damages against 
the defendant, a damage award that was not anticipated in the cost-benefit 
memorandum.98 The cold and calculating nature of the cost-benefit memo 
elicited outrage among the jurors, who apparently felt that Ford had engaged in 
a murder of sorts.99 
What makes the Pinto case interesting for our purposes is that every car 
manufactured, including the Pinto, could be made safer than it is with an 
expenditure of money. In other words, it is foreseeable that some number of 
people will die as a direct result of using a vehicle from a company that made 
the vehicle less safe than it could have been. Crash tests reveal that it is safer to 
be inside some cars than others in the event of a collision100 and that some cars 
do better than others at avoiding accidents entirely. The less-safe cars will, over 
time, result in the deaths of real, live occupants who would have survived in 
 
 96. 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 361–62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). 
 97. Id. at 370, 384. 
 98. Id. The jury awarded Grimshaw, who suffered severe and disfiguring burn injuries, $2,841,000 
compensatory damages and $125 million punitive damages, and to Grays, who died in the accident, 
$659,680 in compensatory damages. Id. at 358 n.1. By contrast, the Ford memo contemplated that the 
company would have to pay $200,000 per burn death and $67,000 per burn injury. See Jean Hampton, 
Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1688 
(1992). 
 99. Hampton, supra note 98, at 1689. 
 100. For example, a Mercedes-Benz C-Class sedan is safer than a Smart car in a collision. See Cheryl 
Jensen, Small Cars Rate Poorly in New Crash Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2009, http:// 
wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/small-cars-rate-poorly-in-new-crash-tests/ (citing Insurance 
Institute for Highway Safety test showing that when a Smart car collided with a Mercedes-Benz C-Class 
sedan, “the little Smart car went airborne and did what amounted to a pirouette”). 
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another vehicle. Understanding this to be true, it is useful to ask what made 
Ford worse than other companies. 
One possibility is that Ford had an actual memorandum in which it explicitly 
placed a dollar figure on the value of a life. The problem with this analysis, 
however, is that car manufacturers routinely decide not to include safety 
features in some of their vehicles and implicitly engage in the same sort of 
numerical analysis, under which they decide whether it is worthwhile, from a 
financial point of view, to include or exclude a particular safety feature. And a 
company would, of necessity, have to place some value on human life—a value 
that would likely reflect the costs it would be compelled to pay for that life—in 
deciding to manufacture a car that is not an impregnable tank. 
Another possibility is that Ford should have placed greater value than it did 
on the lives that would be lost to Pinto crashes. But what should the figure have 
been? Again, it is difficult to imagine a figure bearing any relationship to dollars 
and cents—a necessary aspect of corporate cost-benefit analysis—that would 
not have seemed offensive to a jury. 
Does this mean that the jury found the Pinto offensive as an inherently 
dangerous product, one that a company knows will cause deaths? This seems 
unlikely. There is, after all, no broad movement afoot to eliminate automobiles 
for safety reasons, and everyone knows that automobiles cause large numbers 
of deaths. The problem appears to have been that the jury in the Pinto case 
confronted the real-life, concrete case of two persons, one of whom died an 
excruciating death in a collision and the other who was permanently disfigured 
because of Ford’s decision not to recall the Pinto. 101 It was, in other words, the 
fact of concrete victims whose lost or ruined lives confronted the jury that 
caused the jury to view Ford’s cost-benefit analysis as evidencing a callous 
disregard for human life. For Ford, the statistics reflected in its memo had 
become concrete in the form of plaintiff’s decedent. Had the jury been assessing 
the statistics without the concrete victim, it might have decided the case 
differently. 
IV 
STATISTICAL VERSUS CONCRETE HARM AND NORMATIVE JUDGMENTS 
The tendency to place greater weight on a concrete than on a statistical 
harm is a phenomenon familiar to most people. If we see particular individuals 
suffering, we are far more likely to feel empathy for those individuals and to do 
something to help them, than we are if we learn that some practice consistently 
leads to suffering in many undetermined individuals. A specified harm touches 
us, while a predicted harm, even a large one, may feel distant and unconnected 
to our lives. The knowledge that our minds work in this way has motivated wise 
reformers to provide the public with concrete examples when attempting to 
 
 101. Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358. 
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provoke outrage. The phrase “poster child” colorfully captures the idea that 
people seem to need a concrete existing story to feel moved to action. 
It is, of course, one thing to observe that people tend to favor concrete over 
abstract victims, and it is quite another to invoke the distinction as a normative 
basis or justification for making a decision. Yet the Supreme Court and other 
legal decisionmakers have relied on this distinction as a basis for distinguishing 
between permissible and impermissible conduct, whether that conduct concerns 
police investigation, the death penalty, racial discrimination, or allegedly 
tortious acts. In doing so, such actors squarely present us with the question 
whether our inclination to value concrete over statistical harms is normatively 
proper. 
Authors of a 1997 study posed various theories in an effort to explain the 
“Identifiable Victim Effect,” a phenomenon in which a person predictably feels 
more empathy and a greater willingness to act to rectify the circumstances of 
victims who are known to the person than for unidentified or statistical 
victims.102 These theories included vividness of identifiable victims, the 
proportion-of-the-reference group effect, the ex post–ex ante distinction, and 
the distinction between certainty and uncertainty. After conducting two 
empirical studies that involved posing hypothetical examples to subjects, the 
writers concluded that there is greatest support for the proportion-of-the-
reference-group hypothesis: “the major cause of the identifiable victim effect is 
the relative size of the reference group compared to the number of people at 
risk.”103 In an important sense, for concrete, identifiable victims, the particular 
people harmed constitute the entire reference group, by contrast to statistical 
harms in which five out of every one hundred people to use a particular product 
might have suffered. 
Reading these findings in the light of the initial probable-cause question, 
then, explains why we react to the injustice of arresting the concrete, innocent 
person in the car (along with his guilty companion): because we know the police 
officer is choosing to arrest a person he knows to be innocent (because both 
men cannot be guilty, by hypothesis), and that innocent person therefore 
constitutes the entire reference group, out of which the officer is accordingly 
harming one hundred percent. By contrast, when police arrest a person against 
whom they have probable cause, the reference group becomes the entirety of 
people arrested, against each of whom there is independent probable cause. If 
police get it right fifty percent of the time, this necessarily reduces the harm 
quotient to fifty percent. 
There is some rationality—or proto-rationality—in the desire to 
preferentially condemn actions that harm more (or all) of the relevant 
population and to think less critically about actions that harm a very small 
proportion of the population. It is from this impulse, for example, that we might 
 
 102. Jenni & Loewenstein, supra note 3, at 236–40. 
 103. Id. at 253. 
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decide to require everyone to have a vaccine against a deadly disease. Though 
some number of people will become sick because of the vaccine, the number of 
people who will stay well because of it—if the vaccine is truly warranted—is far 
greater. 
The same is true for doctor-recommended treatments for disease. 
Pharmaceuticals and surgery are not without risks, and over time and large 
numbers, the risks are realized in actual victims. In setting a policy—whether 
for the government or for a particular professional who works with large 
numbers of people—it is crucial to look at the entire group of people who will 
be affected and judge the costs and benefits of the policy accordingly. 
Though it is rational to consider the big picture, it is not always rational to 
characterize the one person who stands before us as the entirety of the relevant 
population. To put this differently, a concrete victim is also frequently a part of 
a larger group of people subjected to a treatment that was judged appropriate in 
virtue of its impact on everyone. In such cases, it can be morally misleading to 
focus on the one concrete victim and ignore the large group of people who did 
not suffer and who might in fact have benefited because of the treatment that 
was applied to everyone. 
Ricci provides a good illustration of this problem. An employer wished to 
avoid giving employees a promotion test that disparately excluded minority 
candidates. Rejecting the results of such a test on the basis of its adverse impact 
represented a racially based decision (in the sense that but for its racial impact, 
the test results would have been certified). The Supreme Court thus classified 
the rejection as racial discrimination (against white employees). At the same 
time, however, the Court suggested that canceling the test in the exam-
development phase, before it was to be administered, would have been fine. 
This is true despite the fact that the reason for rejecting the test would have 
been the same—the (expected) racial composition of the promotion winners. It 
is true, as well, that—by hypothesis—a different test (selected because it would 
not produce a disparate impact) would not have promoted some of the white 
people who would have been promoted under the rejected test. In other words, 
there would still have been people who studied hard for the test, as Frank Ricci 
did, and who would not have received or qualified for a promotion in virtue of 
the selection of a test for its lack of a racially disparate impact. The only 
difference between the hypothetical case described by the Court and the test 
actually employed in Ricci is that the Court knew about Frank Ricci; he was a 
determinate victim rather than a statistical one. 
In such a case, the statistical–concrete distinction appears to rest on an 
irrational foundation, one that treats relevantly similar phenomena differently. 
The Court is perhaps tricked into seeing Frank Ricci and his white colleagues 
who passed the firefighter-promotion exam as the entire universe of relevant 
actors, even as it treats unknown but similarly situated white people as 
belonging to a larger group—the group of all employees who take a test that 
does not produce racially skewed results. 
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In the context of the death penalty and innocence, it seems intuitively more 
appropriate to provide a hearing to a person whose only complaint about the 
proceedings is that the jury reached the wrong result by finding him guilty of 
murder, even though the criminal-justice system has limited resources and 
might reduce the accuracy of trials by delving into specific cases after the fact. 
The reason for this difference, if there is one, is that perhaps we do not and 
cannot know with any confidence that an innocence hearing will lead to errors 
at the trial level. There is reason to suspect, in other words, that such hearings 
may save innocent people from execution without negatively affecting the trial 
process. With so many moving parts in the criminal-justice system, we lack the 
ability to predict real-world costs and benefits in the way that we can for 
vaccines and speed limits. 
Tentatively, then, I would conclude that the statistical–concrete 
distinction—a firmly ingrained psychological inclination among people—is not 
always a logically and normatively trustworthy moral basis on which to make 
decisions. We are nonetheless evidently inclined to rely on it, and we ought 
therefore to be very careful when doing so. We must be vigilant and ask 
ourselves why the concrete harm appears worse than the statistical harm in a 
particular case. We should attempt to view the concrete in a statistical frame 
and vice versa to determine whether, in a given case, we are reflexively drawing 
a distinction without a difference. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The probable cause case of Maryland v. Pringle—and the hypothetical 
scenarios it has inspired—expose the distinct way in which we tend to think 
about statistical versus concrete victims of official (and other) conduct. In this 
article I sought to expose the degree to which this distinction drives 
decisionmaking in the law, both consciously and implicitly, in areas ranging 
from the Fourth Amendment suppression context and the death penalty to 
antidiscrimination law and negligent torts. 
Because this is primarily a descriptive paper, my goal has been to 
demonstrate precisely how the statistical–concrete distinction operates in legal 
thinking, rather than to suggest that it is either good or bad. Furthermore, even 
if one were to find fault with it from a normative perspective, one would have to 
acknowledge that it represents an apparently quite strong inclination, in lay 
people as well as in judicial professionals. As a result, an attempt to “get away” 
from the distinction altogether is unlikely to prove fruitful. The very fact that 
courts explicitly rely on it as a rationale in their decisionmaking process 
counsels caution in judging it overly harshly. 
Nonetheless, there does appear to be arbitrariness—sometimes—about the 
contrast between what we are prepared to do (or to tolerate others doing) to a 
concrete, known individual, on the one hand, and what we are prepared to do to 
individuals whose identities are not yet known but who will just as surely exist, 
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on the other. It is therefore important for us to scrutinize our reactions, to both 
concrete and abstract cases, to ensure that we can truly justify distinguishing 
cases that might really be the same. 
Because the project began with the probable-cause case, I will state my own 
opinion on it, for what it is worth. On the assumption that probable cause 
amounts to a probability of 0.5 (or less), as the cases say that it does, I would 
treat the police officer who arrests two people, one of whom is guilty, the same 
way as I would treat the officer who arrests one person with a 0.5 chance of 
guilt. 
Though an officer in the first instance knowingly arrests an innocent person, 
the Fourth Amendment itself knowingly authorizes the arrest of innocent 
people, provided the officer is persuaded (by odds of 0.5, perhaps) that such 
people are not innocent. To suggest otherwise, it seems to me, is to pretend that 
the Fourth Amendment precludes—or even approaches precluding—the arrest 
of innocent people, and this is a destructive pretense that may contribute to the 
“presumption of guilt” that often seems to accompany an arrest. To state this 
differently, whatever discomfort we have with authorizing the arrest of innocent 
people ought to play a role in developing the standard for arrest, rather than 
generate a different legal approach to the two-people–one-innocent scenario.104 
 
 104. Several of my colleagues, including Steve Shiffrin, identify the “double effect” argument for 
distinguishing the officer who arrests two (one of whom is innocent) from the officer who arrests one 
(with a 0.5 chance of innocence). In the first case, on this approach, the officer intentionally arrests an 
innocent person as a means of finding the guilty person, and it is impermissible, under Catholic 
doctrine, intentionally to commit a harm against an innocent as a means of accomplishing even an 
equally or more beneficial objective. In the second case, by contrast, the officer arrests someone he 
believes to be guilty, so there is no knowing arrest of any innocents. 
  The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) does not entirely track the statistical–concrete 
distinction because there are cases which violate DDE but which fall on the “statistical” side of the 
disparity (and accordingly trigger less intuitional discomfort than comparable concrete cases), and there 
are other cases that satisfy DDE, even though they produce concrete, determinate, and particular harm 
(and trigger a correspondingly greater moral discomfort). See supra note 12. Nonetheless, DDE does 
appear to map onto the probable-cause scenario here described, and I accordingly want to respond to 
it, in this limited scenario. 
  For an individual police officer, it is true that any specific arrest on probable cause will leave 
uncertain whether the suspect is actually innocent (by contrast to the arrest of the two people, one of 
whom is known to be innocent). If we consider the dilemma at the level of policymaking, however, 
rather than at the level of the particular police officer carrying out a particular arrest, some 
commonalities between the two sorts of arrest scenarios become evident. 
  First, our decision as a policymaker to select a standard with a higher error rate commits us to 
arresting some number of innocent people, and we nonetheless choose to authorize all of these 
arrests—like the officer who arrests the two people, one guilty and one innocent—as a means of 
ensuring the arrest of more guilty people than we could accomplish with a higher standard of proof. In 
other words, when we select fifty percent odds as our probable cause standard, the individual police 
officer may not be using his particular suspect (whom he believes is guilty) in any specific case, but we, 
in selecting the standard, are deciding to arrest thousands of innocent people to ensure that thousands 
of guilty people are arrested, and we therefore are using the innocent to get at the guilty. 
  Furthermore, the officer is in fact implicated too. Like the policymaker who authorizes the 
arrest of a large number of people, at least half of whom will be innocent, the officer who arrests 
hundreds or thousands of people in the course of a career, employing the probable-cause standard, 
knows that she is arresting a significant number of innocent people. She can avoid doing so by 
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One way of thinking about the irrationality (in my view) of distinguishing 
the two sorts of cases in this context is to imagine that an officer confronts the 
two-people–one-innocent situation. She could, if she embraces the distinction, 
select one of the two people and arrest him and only him. Such a move would 
turn the scenario into a typical probabilities case, acceptable to everyone, even 
though there would be no reason to distinguish between the person she is 
arresting and the person she is not arresting. Another police officer, seeing what 
was going on, might then decide to arrest the other person, again on the 0.5 
odds rationale that everyone accepts. To suggest that what has happened is 
morally distinct from the original hypothetical case (of arresting two, knowing 
one is innocent) or the statistical case (of arresting one out of the crowd, with a 
0.5 probability of guilt), however, seems intuitively incorrect. 
In my view, the Court—if and when it reaches this issue—should reject the 
argument that police must never arrest a group of people if one of the people is 
innocent. Many (including some of my colleagues) might disagree with my 
assessment of the normative merits of this probable-cause case. More important 
than its particular application here, however, is the lesson we gain from 
considering the power that the statistical–concrete distinction holds over our 
thinking. Such consideration can divest the line of some of its strength and can 
open our minds to a more subtle analysis of particular cases. The tension 
between our impulses in statistical versus concrete cases will likely persist, but it 
will yield greater thought and analysis if we are aware of its presence and of the 
dangers of assuming that it necessarily draws a valid line in every case. 
 
 
implementing a stricter standard for arrest (for example, proof beyond a reasonable doubt), which 
would reduce the number of guilty and innocent people apprehended. By the standard she applies, she 
accordingly, and knowingly, sacrifices some number of innocent people—or, at least, their liberty for 
the period of arrest—as a means of apprehending a larger number of guilty people. Their sacrifice 
therefore serves as a means of enabling the apprehension of the additional guilty, and the calculus is 
knowing rather than merely negligent or reckless with respect to the arrest of the innocent. For a 
comprehensive discussion of “double-effect” moral reasoning, see generally THE DOCTRINE OF 
DOUBLE EFFECT: PHILOSOPHERS DEBATE A CONTROVERSIAL MORAL PRINCIPLE (P. A. Woodward 
ed., 2001). 
